Animals, Slaves, and Corporations

Analyzing Legal Thinghood

Bibliographic Data

ID5851341
AuthorsVisa A J Kurki (0000-0002-1308-6398, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume18
Issue5
Pages1069-1090
Publication date2017-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Law Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2071-8322 • E-ISSN: 2071-8322
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s2071832200022252
OpenAlexW2795662760
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited9

The Article analyzes the notion of legal "thinghood" in the context of the person-thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one's chosen definition of "thing" is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of "legal thing" are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, and things as property. The first two definitions are rejected as not being very interesting or serving any heuristic function. Conversely, understanding legal things as property is meaningful, useful, and helps to understand what it means to say that animals are legally things. Defining things as property has certain rather important implications, which are analyzed at the end of the Article. For instance, not everything needs to be either a person or a thing: The historical institution of outlawry involved treating individuals neither as legal persons nor as legal things. One must conclude that the person-thing bifurcation is less fundamental than is often assumed

Institution · The Thing · Legal principles and applications · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Property Rights and Legal Doctrine

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