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The Essential in Essential Facilities

The Case of Digital Platforms

Bibliographic Data

ID5862874
AuthorsCamila Cabral Pires Alves (0000-0001-7888-3235), Diandra Carolina Da Rocha (0009-0009-6052-2875), Emiliana Pomarico Ribeiro (0000-0003-4032-9962), João Luiz Pondé (0009-0007-6168-9867), Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado (0000-0001-8269-2853), Marcos Puccioni De Oliveira Lyra (0000-0003-4427-1147)
Year2023
Volume20
Issue107
Publication date2023-10-31
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDireito Público (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1806-8200 • E-ISSN: 2236-1766
PublisherInstituto Brasiliense de Direito Publico (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.11117/rdp.v20i107.7288
OpenAlexW4388125757
LanguageEN
References cited1

The paper examines the applicability of the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) in the context of competition policy in digital platform markets. It begins by comparing this doctrine with the traditional antitrust approach to anti-competitive practices such as tying and raising rivals' costs. It demonstrates that both approaches aim to address antitrust harm resulting from the extension of market power into additional competitive environments. However, the EFD also considers specific conditions that warrant non-discriminatory access obligations and potential regulatory intervention. This comparative analysis of similarities and differences is employed to address antitrust issues in digital platform markets, given the existence of bottlenecks and gatekeepers that can exploit market power. The paper uses the Buscapé v. Google (Google Shopping) case, which was examined by Brazilian antitrust authority in 2019, as an illustrative example to highlight the possible approaches to these antitrust concerns. KEYWORDS: Essential Facilities Doctrine; Refuse to Deal; Market Power Leveraging; Digital Platforms, Antitrust Policy

Business · Collusion · Competition (biology · Competition law · Computer security · Context (archaeology · Doctrine · Economics · Exploit · Harm · Industrial organization · Intervention (counseling · Law and economics · Market power · Microeconomics · Political science · Price fixing · Rule of reason · Supreme court · Tying · Warrant · Computer Science · Digital Platforms and Economics · Merger and Competition Analysis · Law

  • Anticompetitive Exclusion

    Thomas G Krattenmaker, Steven C Salop•The Yale Law Journal•1986

Highly citedNo

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