Argumentation in the Interpretation of Statutory Law and International Law

Not Ejusdem Generis

Bibliographic Data

ID5900950
AuthorsJennifer Smolka (University of Fribourg, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume7
Issue2
Pages132
Publication date2022-05-24
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLanguages (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2226-471X • E-ISSN: 2226-471X
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/languages7020132
OpenAlexW4281477351
LanguageEN
References cited50

This contribution bridges three fields-pragmatics, argumentation, and law. Arguments can be seen as the verbal formulation of inferences that articulate justificatory relationships, meaning that behind every argument is at least one argumentative inference. As an argumentative activity and verbal practice, legal discourse has gaps to be filled by pragmatic inference. Neo- and post-Gricean frameworks can thus tentatively be used for its analysis. Based on these frameworks, this contribution asks whether argumentation in the interpretation of statutory law is the same as in international law. More precisely, it looks at judges' legal interpretations, which function as justifying arguments because they are constrained by rules/canons of interpretation. It is shown that neither a pragma-dialectical hierarchy of statutory canons nor a hierarchy of related presumptions carries over to international law where there is no such hierarchy

Argument (complex analysis · Argumentation theory · Argumentative · Dialectic · Epistemology · Hierarchy · Inference · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Political science · Pragmatics · Sociology · Statutory interpretation · Statutory law · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal Language and Interpretation · Philosophy

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