Twain's Law of Politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917408 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William R Dougan (Clemson University, corresponding author), Ivette Jans (University of Nebraska System) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 518-536 |
| Publication date | 1993-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463193005004007 |
| OpenAlex | W2027157343 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
This article models the electoral process as a game of incomplete information in which voters choose between candidates on the basis of the likelihood that each will fulfill the campaign promises made. The electorate's uncertainty about the future behavior of its representatives means that some candidates will win seats even though they are not committed to performing as promised. Moreover, because such candidates have more actions available to them than do their honest counterparts, they enjoy an electoral advantage until voters have acquired full information about them. This advantage makes a political career more attractive to dishonest individuals than to honest members of the same occupational class, so that dishonest people will tend disproportionately to enter politics
Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Race, History, and American Society
A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
The Rationality of Ideology
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians
The control of politicians
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Political cheating
| Highly cited | No |
|---|