Time Preference and Learning Versus Selection
A Case Study of Ukrainian Students
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917432 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marianna A Klochko (The Ohio State University), Marianna Klochko (The Ohio State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 305-331 |
| Publication date | 2006-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463106066376 |
| OpenAlex | W2089762974 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
With few exceptions, economic theory assumes that people's valuations of the future - the discount applied to the future as opposed to the present - are fixed and exogenously set. The relevance of this assumption derives from the fact that this parameter of individual preference is critical in determining the likelihood that a person will engage in cooperative action, including the likelihood that they will abide by democratic norms and participate constructively in the development of efficient and competitive markets. Using a sample of Ukrainian youth - those who have emigrated to the West to complete their studies as compared to those who have remained in Ukraine - I question the validity of this assumption. Although the data reveals that those students who travel to the West are an unrepresentative sample of Ukraine's student population generally in terms of the time discount they apply to the future, the data also suggest that the discount they apply to the future changes as a function of their length of stay in the West
Democracy · Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Population · Positive economics · Preference · Revealed preference · Sociology · Time preference · Ukrainian · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Demography · Economic theories and models · Global Health Care Issues
The Moral Economy of Communities
The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions
Time Discounting and Time Preference
The evolution of cooperation
Corruption and Government
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Constitutional stability
Corruption, Cooperation and Endogenous Time Discount Rates
Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity
Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats Into a Model of General Deterrence
Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality
Cooperation as a Transmitted Cultural Trait
Ulysses Unbound
The Evolution of Norms
| Highly cited | No |
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