The game of the name
A fundamental analysis of the institution of names
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917457 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Louise Gauthier (0000-0001-6639-5453, Espace, Pratiques sociales et Images dans les mondes Grec et Romain (ESPRI), Archéologie et Sciences de l'Antiquité (ArScAn), UMR 7041, Université Paris Nanterre, France, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 42-74 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/10434631251366145 |
| OpenAlex | W4413848794 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 46 |
The fact that we all have names makes naming an ubiquitous institution. We develop a game-theoretic model to explain the existence of single names (anthroponyms) and how they may be exchanged as a way to promote cooperation. In social interactions, names provide partial identification information that can help reduce the likelihood of cheating, which would be higher with alternative information structures. We then propose a definition of honor based on the probability of being cheated, and derive general patterns for optimal naming that may maximize honor
Epistemology · Institution · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Authorship Attribution and Profiling · Law · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Philosophy
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games
Social Structure, Infectious Diseases, Disasters, Secularism, and Cultural Change in America
Fitting In or Standing Out
Understanding the Rise of Unique Names
Economics and Identity
Individual Strategy and Social Structure
A Theory of Conformity
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Crime and Punishment
Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information
Risk and Temptation
Penalty has no Impact on Crime
First names in social and ethnic contexts
What's in a Surname? The Effects of Surname Initials on Academic Success
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |