Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement
An Experimental Test
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917482 |
|---|---|
| Authors | C Horne (0000-0001-5318-6978, Brigham Young University, corresponding author), Anna Cutlip (Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 285-307 |
| Publication date | 2002-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463102014003002 |
| OpenAlex | W2096183708 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 27 |
This article focuses on the relationship between the costs of norm enforcement and the extent to which such enforcement actually occurs. We predict that as costs increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior is less likely. In addition, however, costs have a positive effect on the strength of meta-norms that encourage sanctioning. These meta-norms, in turn, lead to more frequent enforcement. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods and, for the most part, are supported
Business · Economics · Enforcement · Law enforcement · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
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| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2024 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |