Structural Conditions of Preferences for Segregation
An Application of Coleman's `Linear System of Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917618 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frank Kalter (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 425-449 |
| Publication date | 2000-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/104346300012004004 |
| OpenAlex | W2137980355 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 6 |
Why might rational actors be interested in establishing a system of segregation, and under what structural conditions will this be more or less likely? To answer these questions, Coleman's `linear system of action' serves as a starting point. It can be shown that, given a random assignment of interest and control, a considerable number of actors may gain by splitting the group according to a binary ascriptive characteristic. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that they will indeed come to a respective agreement because ascriptive characteristics serve as focal points in collective decision-making. With the help of computer simulations, how the likelihood of group separation is affected by several structural parameters can be analyzed. It is evident that increasing the number of goods exchanged within a given system is a good recipe for preventing segregation
Arithmetic · Binary number · Collective action · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public good · Sociology · Law · Mathematics · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Social Power and Status Dynamics · Urban, Neighborhood, and Segregation Studies
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2015 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |