The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Commission, 1927–2012

Anticorruption Investigation and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist Party

Bibliographic Data

ID6007907
AuthorsLing Li (0000-0002-1642-142X, Northwest University of Political Science and Law, Xi’an, China, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume42
Issue5
Pages447-482
Publication date2016-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueModern China (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0097-7004 • E-ISSN: 1552-6836
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0097700416631047
OpenAlexW2382603993
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited14

This article traces and analyzes the longitudinal changes in the operative structure, rules, and practices of the Chinese Communist Party’s disciplinary institution not for the purpose of appraising its performance in corruption control but to demonstrate how the party regulates its own enforcement agency through institutionalizing the disciplinary decision-making process. To that end, this article identifies and explains the exact measures the party has used to delegate authority to the party’s disciplinary institution in a systematic and institutionalized manner without losing control over disciplinary outcomes. It also identifies three features of the institutionalization process: concentration and centralization of disciplinary power and further depoliticization of disciplinary activities

Agency (philosophy · Commission · Communism · Control (management · Delegate · Discipline · Economics · Enforcement · Institution · Institutionalisation · Management · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Process (computing · Public relations · Social science · Sociology · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Public Administration · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

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