The politics of autocratic survival in Equatorial Guinea
Co-optation, restrictive institutional rules, repression, and international projection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6027478 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ana Lúcia Sá (0000-0003-1299-6653, Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa), Edalina Rodrigues Sanches (0000-0001-6007-3680, Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 120 |
| Issue | 478 |
| Pages | 78-102 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | African Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0001-9909 • E-ISSN: 1468-2621 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/afraf/adaa030 |
| OpenAlex | W3124766864 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 9 |
Equatorial Guinea is not only one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes but also a striking case of regime and leader survival. This small, oil-rich state and personalist regime defies conventional wisdom because it is both far more resilient and faces far fewer threats from within the regime and from opposition political parties than other resource-rich states. But how does the regime manage to survive? This study argues that four key mechanisms interact to explain Equatorial Guinea’s record of authoritarian survival. Firstly, co-optation (via patronage, party, and cabinet appointments) which President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the regime party—Partido democrático de guinea ecuatorial—have used to build internal cohesion and fragment opposition. Secondly, the crafting of restrictive institutional rules (party and electoral laws) that, combined with informal rules, aim to protect the regime’s interests and make participation in political opposition more costly. Thirdly, the use of (selective and diffuse) repression to shield the regime and shrink the living space of challengers. Finally, the regime’s international linkages and projection to gain credibility and offset pressure for change. We argue that autocrats’ survival depends on their ability to play a strategic two-level game: domestic and international
Authoritarianism · Autocracy · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Opposition (politics) · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regime change · Hispanic-African Historical Relations · Law
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| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |