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The Black Hole of Centralization

Subnational Emergency Invocations During the Tenures of Indira Gandhi and Narendra Modi

Bibliographic Data

ID6040329
AuthorsPanch Rishi Dev Sharma (0000-0003-1707-8261, University of Lucknow, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume17
Issue3
Publication date2025-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAsian Politics & Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1943-0787 • E-ISSN: 1943-0779
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/aspp.70023
OpenAlexW4411834108
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited23

The constitutional provision of “Subnational Emergency” under Article 356 of the Constitution of India, 1950, extraordinarily empowers the central (union) government to acquire executive and legislative powers of the states (subnational units) on the occurrence of an undefined and largely unrestrained state of “constitutional machinery failure” emergency. Since 1950, central governments have imposed 121 subnational emergency invocations covering almost all Indian states at least once. The oft‐abused subnational emergency power has generated a black hole of centralization overpowering the gravity of federalism, constitutionalism, and democracy in India. The frequency of subnational emergency invocations reaches its zenith during the regimes of single‐party personality‐dominated central governments. The article comparatively explores two of the most prominent tenures of single‐party personality‐dominated central governments under Indira Gandhi (1967–1977, 1980–1984) and Narendra Modi (2014–2024) regarding the grounds, manner, justifications, and state of restraints on subnational emergency power

Political science · Bangladesh Politics, Society, and Development · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · South Asian Studies and Conflicts

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    Open Access•Britt Leake, Pradeep Chhibber•Social Science Quarterly•2024

  • India in 2020

    Eswaran Sridharan•Asian Survey•2021

  • India in 1975

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  • Federalism or Patrimonialism

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  • Succession in India 1967

    Michael Brecher•Asian Survey•1967

  • Presidential Rule in India

    Bhagwan D Dua•Asian Survey•1979

  • Bridling Central Tyranny in India

    Anoop Sadanandan•Asian Survey•2012

  • Coalitions and Party Strategies in India's Parliamentary Federation

    Eswaran Sridharan•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2003

Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Highly citedNo

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