CJKInvestment Agreements inEastAsia
Building a Bifurcated Investment Regime
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6040499 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gregory P Corning (0000-0002-4565-8012, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 285-306 |
| Publication date | 2014-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Politics & Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1943-0787 • E-ISSN: 1943-0779 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/aspp.12111 |
| OpenAlex | W1547371422 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
InMay 2012,China,Japan, andSouthKorea (CJK) signed a trilateral investment agreement—their first legal agreement on trilateral economic cooperation. This article argues that the diffusion of liberal investment rules in the trilateral agreement was circumscribed byChina's market power. It examines the evolution ofCJKpolicies on investment agreements and how these policies clashed in the negotiation of the trilateral deal. During the last decade,Japan andKorea have secured agreements withSoutheastAsian nations that liberalize rules governing investment but they were unable to pushChina toward preestablishment liberalization in the trilateral agreement. As a result, there is a bifurcation of investment rules inEastAsia with more liberal rules amongJapan,Korea, andSoutheastAsia than any that the three share withChina
Economics · Investment (military · Liberalization · Market economy · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · International Arbitration and Investment Law · International Development and Aid · Law · State Capitalism and Financial Governance
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| Citations per year | 0.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |