Running Multiple Candidates, Dividing the Vote Under the Single Nontransferable Vote System
Evidence From Japan's Upper House Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6041205 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Naofumi Fujimura (0000-0003-3600-5770, PRS Legislative Research, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 402-426 |
| Publication date | 2017-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Politics & Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1943-0787 • E-ISSN: 1943-0779 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/aspp.12331 |
| OpenAlex | W2735345176 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
Political parties seek to make optimal nominations of candidates to maximize the number of seats they may win. In a multimember district with a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system, parties need to run the optimal number of candidates in each electoral district. If too many or too few candidates run, they may lose seats they might otherwise have won. In this situation, district‐level party organizations face a collective action problem: they do not have the incentive to run multiple candidates for fear of losing all seats, despite needing to do so in order for the party to win a majority of seats in a legislature. This study examines the factors that enable parties to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts, and shows that parties undertake this action when they are able to divide the vote between party candidates on the basis of geography in the case of Japan
Action (physics · Collective action · Democracy · Economics · Electoral system · Face (sociological concept · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Lower house · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Single non-transferable vote · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Finance
The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP
Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan
Electoral Reform and National Security in Japan
Japan Transformed
Delinking National and Local Party Systems
Removing Boundaries, Losing Connections
Japan's Political Marketplace
Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities
Incumbency Disadvantage under Electoral Rules with Intraparty Competition
Democracy Without Competition in Japan
Party Strategy or Candidate Strategy
Over-nominating candidates, undermining the party
Candidates, Votes, Outcomes
Bamboo Shoots and Weak Roots
Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System
Toward a Context-Rich Analysis of Electoral Systems
An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behaviour Applied to Japanese District Elections
Structure and Behaviour
Factional Competition for the Party Endorsement
Adaptive parties
Reducing nomination errors
SNTV and d'hondt are 'equivalent
Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |