Sovereign Immunity in an Economic Theory of Government Behavior
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6090538 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael N Hayes (I Wish, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 283-315 |
| Publication date | 1990-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Law & Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1990.tb00050.x |
| OpenAlex | W2001355899 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 put government on an equal footing in tort law with private individuals. It also provides a very broadly defined immunity for any public function of a discretionary nature. While economists argue that immunity does not minimize social costs, this analysis outlines a theoretically optimal mix of liability and immunity. Discretionary governmental policy must be immune as it establishes principles of government conduct. Tort liability then insures cost‐minimizing policy execution. This theory of state behavior links a number of leading/controversial immunity cases that otherwise exhibit no consistent thought
Business · Damages · Economics · Function (biology · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Liability · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Sovereign immunity · Sovereignty · State (computer science · Tort · Computer Science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Legal principles and applications
Structure and change in economic history
Going by the book
Theory of the firm
The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing
The Visible Hand
Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Revealed Preference of Government
Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory
| Highly cited | No |
|---|