Regulatory Disclosure of Offending Companies in the Dutch Financial Market
Consumer Protection or Enforcement Publicity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6090750 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Judith Van Erp (0000-0003-4175-1540, Erasmus University Rotterdam, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 407-433 |
| Publication date | 2010-08-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Law & Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2010.00326.x |
| OpenAlex | W1502432935 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 26 |
Regulatory disclosure of names of offending companies is increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional command and control regulation. The goals and intended effects of disclosure are not always clear, however. Do regulators wish to increase their transparency, or do they intend to name and shame? This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying working mechanism of regulatory disclosure of offenders' names through a case study of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets' disclosure policy. It distinguishes two types of disclosure strategies: consumer oriented and firm oriented. The case study shows that although informing consumers was the primary purpose of disclosure as intended by the Dutch legislature, the purpose in practice has shifted to informing companies about the regulators' enforcement policy. The nature of the disclosed information makes it unlikely that disclosure adequately prevents financial risk taking by consumers. Instead of empowering consumers, disclosure has been incorporated in a traditional deterrence logic, turning out not to be an example of new governance but instead a modern version of command and control enforcement publicity
Business · Computer security · Control (management · Corporate governance · Deterrence theory · Economics · Enforcement · Full disclosure · Legislature · Political science · Public disclosure · Public relations · Publicity · Shame · Transparency (behavior · Criminal Law and Evidence · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting · Finance · Marketing
Colouring outside the lines
Shaming climate wrongdoers
Information Disclosure by the European Union as a Tool to Improve Implementation? A Comparative Analysis of the Perception of Domestic Regulators
The Formation of Stakeholders' Trust in Regulatory Agencies
Shining Light on Charities or Looking in the Wrong Place? Regulation-by-Transparency in Canada
Naming without shaming
Can decision transparency increase citizen trust in regulatory agencies? Evidence from a representative survey experiment
Regulation‐by‐information in areas of limited statehood
Does Disclosure of Performance Information Influence Street‐level Bureaucrats’ Enforcement Style
Regulators as Guardians of Trust? The Contingent and Modest Positive Effect of Targeted Transparency on Citizen Trust in Regulated Sectors
Messy Business
Compliance with Food Safety Laws in Germany
Going by the book
Regulatory Capitalism
Smart Regulation
Responsive Regulation
Transparency
Crime, Shame and Reintegration
Walls of secrecy and silence
Social License and Environmental Protection
The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies
Evidence and Policy and Naming and Shaming
Going by the Book
From government to governance
Juggling Conflicting Demands
The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Government
Disclosure and compliance
Redundant Regulation
Compliance Motivations
Curbing Consumer Financial Losses
Regulatory Innovation and the Online Consumer
General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior
Does the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Engage in “Trial by Media
The "Compliance" Trap
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,8 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |