Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda

A London Counterterrorism Case Study

Bibliographic Data

ID6097416
AuthorsRobert Lambert (University of Exeter, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume41
Issue1
Pages31-35
Publication date2008-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePS Political Science & Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1049-0965 • E-ISSN: 1537-5935
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1049096508080049
OpenAlexW2081745212
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited14

If it is assessed against an objective of reducing the number of Muslims recruited or inspired to commit terrorist acts in the name of al-Qaeda, then the U.S.-led, UK-backed war on terror launched in the aftermath of 9/11 has failed demonstrably. This performance-related assessment, as William Tupman and Carina O'Reilly argue, favors examining counterterrorism experience and the consistency of government conduct during the war on terror (Tupman and O'Reilly 2004). Such an approach, however, tends to expose the disregard the architects of the war on terror had for counterterrorism experience and policy-makers in the U.S. or UK have not adopted it in the six years since 9/11. Performance measurement may be routine in other areas of government-sponsored activity, but the war on terror has always been presented as a separate and exceptional activity dealing with an extraordinary enemy where familiar rules of engagement and conventional government behavior do not apply. However, in writing this introduction on 9/11 in 2007, it is apparent that the failure of the response to the world's most dramatic terrorist attack has finally become clear to many who supported it for the major part of its duration. Not that there is a consensus about the nature and extent of the failure. Nor is there a willingness to look to prior counterterrorism experience that might have been used to promote a measured, effective, and counterintuitive response to 9/11. Rather, notwithstanding moves to re-brand the war on terror in softer tones with particular emphasis on counterinsurgency “hearts and minds” approaches (Kilcullen 2006), the sixth anniversary of 9/11 marks the culmination of a poorly targeted military led response that has unintentionally boosted al-Qaeda credibility and recruitment

Adversary · Al qaeda · Commit · Computer security · Criminology · Foreign policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Terrorism · War on terror · Law · Military History and Strategy · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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