Malfeasance in the Charitable Sector

Determinants of “Soft” Corruption at Nonprofit Organizations

Bibliographic Data

ID6112709
AuthorsMark Steven Leclair (Fairfield University)
Year2019
Volume21
Issue1
Pages54-68
Publication date2019-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Integrity (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1558-0989 • E-ISSN: 1099-9922
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10999922.2017.1422310
OpenAlexW2791939774
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited38

The causes and effects of organizational corruption have been widely examined in the literature, including malfeasance that is specific to nonprofits organizations. This article draws a distinction between outright (illegal) and “soft” corruption—the latter referring to the continued and deliberate misuse of donated funds to benefit officers of the nonprofit, with little (in some instances less than 5%) going to the nonprofit’s supposed cause. Soft corruption enables organizations to function essentially as counterfeit charities without risking legal peril. An empirical model encompassing approximately 450 randomly drawn nonprofits tests the determinants of this form of misbehavior. Ultimately it is shown that either the existence of an independent voting board or the conduct of an independent audit are the most important means of preventing soft corruption; far more important than state- or federally-mandated reporting requirements

Audit · Business · Counterfeit · Economics · Language change · Nonprofit Sector · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Voting · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Accounting

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