The Operational Code of Mao Zedong

Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting. Acknowledgments This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, 25 February–1 March 2003; the underlying research was supported by a Peace Scholar award from the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The author thanks Michael Young and Social Science Automation, Inc., for permission to use Profiler+ as the automated content-analysis software for this project, and Mark Schafer for assistance in constructing the VICS dictionaries and advice on the statistical analysis. Above all, the author thanks Stephen Walker for all the effort and time he spent on this project. Notes 1Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Although Johnston himself no longer appears to hold these views, others in the academic and policy communities continue to do so. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security 27, no. 4 (spring 2003): 5–56. 2In the Korean War, China sent its forces to support the "buffer state" of North Korea not just for ideological reasons but also out of security concerns; the United States was approaching the border area close to northeastern China. In the Sino-Indian War, the Chinese troops withdrew after victory without occupying any territory. In the Sino-Vietnam War, the Chinese leaders sent its troops to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and did not remain to occupy any territory. 3 VICS is a computer software program for content analysis that retrieves and analyzes a leader's operational code. See Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders," in The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, ed. Jerrold M. Post (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003): 215–45. 4Overviews of the defensive and offensive realism debate include Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen M. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995): ix–xii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): xiv–xx; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security 23, no. 2 (fall 1998): 157–82; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177–98. 5 According to Jeffrey Taliaferro, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167–214, provides the theoretical foundations for defensive realism. Defensive realism as defined by Taliaferro has four auxiliary assumptions that specify how structural variables translate into international outcomes and states' foreign policies: the security dilemma is an intractable feature of anarchy; structural modifiers, such as the offense-defense balance, geographic proximity, and access to raw materials, influence the severity of the security dilemma between particular states; material power drives states' foreign policy through the medium of leaders' calculations and perceptions; and domestic politics can limit the efficiency of a state's response to the external environment. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," International Security 25, no. 3 (winter 2000–2001): 128–61. Examples of defensive realist works are Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137–68; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 65–98; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994–95); Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1997): 171–201; and Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 497–538. 6Examples of offensive realist works are John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994–95): 5–49; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 90–121; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72–107; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1–49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 114–55. 7Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." 8Joseph M Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview, 1997). 9Barry Posen points out that there are disagreements among scholars over the concepts of strategies and doctrines. "Military writers do not agree on definitions of the terms strategy, military doctrine, and tactics. In simplest terms, however, tactics is the study of how fights are fought. In my view, once one begins to ask questions about how battles are fought, one has entered the realm of military doctrine. When one begins to ask which wars shall be fought, or if war should be fought, one has entered the realm of strategy." Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 245n3. The ambiguity over military doctrine and grand strategy is also one problem with Johnston's analysis of Chinese grand strategy. He constantly refers to "grand strategic means," and he states that it is not all that helpful "to subsume political ends and grand strategic means within the same concept." Therefore, his use of the term "grand strategy" focuses mainly on the grand strategic means, which does not emphasize other means much besides the military ones. See Johnston, Cultural Realism, 110–17. 10Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, ed., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–6; and Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 24–25. Rosecrance and Stein state that "grand strategy considers all the resources at the disposal of the nation (not just military ones), and it attempts to array them effectively to achieve security in both peace and war" (p. 4). Posen states that he conceives of grand strategy as a chain of political ends and military means: "Its effectiveness is highly dependent on the extent to which the ends and means are related to one another," which he terms the "political-military integration." "In peace or war, the fundamental question of political-military integration is whether the statesman has at hand the military instruments required to achieve those political goals deemed essential to the security of the state" (p. 25). 11Strategic culture as a concept was coined in the cold war by Jack Snyder in his famous study of the Soviet strategic decision-making process. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations RAND Corporation report R-2154-aF (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1977); see also Jack L. Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," in Strategic Power: USA/USSR , ed. Carl Jacobsen (London: MacMillan, 1990). Some recent works on Chinese strategic culture include Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980 (Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 1993); Shu Guang Zhang, "China: Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martin"s, 1999); Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," in Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control, and Security Building. ed. Keith R. Krause (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000); Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," Strategic Studies Institute occasional paper (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2002), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/culture/culture.htm; Andrew Scobell, "The Chinese Cult of Defense," Issues and Studies 37, no. 5 (September–October 2001): 100–127; Yuan-Kang Wang, "Culture and Foreign Policy: What Imperial China Tells Us," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 2002 (cited with author's permission); Guangwu Wang, "The Chinese Way: China's Position in International Relations," Norwegian Nobel Institute Lecture Series (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press:, 1995), 89; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Tiejun Zhang, "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features," Comparative Strategy 21, no. 2 (April 2002): 73–90; and Lawrence C. Katzenstein, "Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China," and Rosita Dellios, "'How May the World Be at Peace?': Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture," both in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 12See the debate between Alastair I. Johnston and Colin Gray in the following works: Colin S Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999): 49–69; Johnston, Cultural Realism; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray," Review of International Studies 25, no. 3 (July 1999): 519–23. Gray acknowledges that gathering all scholars working on the topic makes only "a small party." Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," 49 n1. 13See Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy 10, no. 2 (January–March 1991): 3–23; Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters," 87; and Johnston, Cultural Realism. In this paper, I adopt Johnston's definition, which I think is more comprehensive than the other definitions in structuring the concept and in pointing out a method of measurement. 14Klein, "Theory of Strategic Culture," 11. 15Although acknowledging that Chinese strategic culture is offensive, these scholars disagree about how many strategic cultures China has—i.e., if it has one or two strategic cultures. Some state that China has only one strategic culture, realpolitik, because Confucianism does not function in actual policymaking. Others stress that China has one strategic culture, but that it is the Confucian strategic culture that is influencing the beliefs and behavior of Chinese leaders. A more complex view is that there are two strategic cultures, and the Chinese apply the Confucian strategic culture when building on their self-image and resort to the realist parabellum norms when encountering other countries. Thomas Kane, for example, argues for the influence of legalism, which is the realpolitik counterpart of Confucianism. See Thomas Kane, "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy," Comparative Strategy 20, no. 1 (January 2001): 45–55; Johnston, Cultural Realism; Alastair I. Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alastair I. Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post–Cold War Period," in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999);Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View," Foreign Affairs75, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 37–52; Wang, "Culture and Foreign Policy"; John K. Fairbank, The United States and China(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Zhang, "Chinese Strategic Culture"; Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture"; and Scobell, "Chinese Cult of Defense." 16As Deng Xiaoping said during his visit to the United States in 1979, "The Chinese People suffered amply from the miseries of war. We do not wish to fight a war unless it is forced upon us. We are firmly against a new world war. ... [W]e want peace—a genuine peace in which the people of each country may develop and progress as they wish, free from aggression, interference, and bullying." Beijing Review, February 9, 1979. 17Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Garden City, NJ: Anchor, 1972); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan," International Security 26, no. 2 (autumn 2001): 103–31; and Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975). 18Johnston, Cultural Realism, 66. 19Face validity is the first criterion for selecting items for an index. If you want to measure political conservatism, for example, each of the items should appear on its face to indicate conservatism or its opposite, liberalism. In other words, you are measuring what you intend to measure. See Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 9th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2001), 152. Face validity does not depend on established theories for support. See Arlene Fink, How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995). 20Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," 217n2. 21Johnston's use of sources displays a selection bias that some other scholars, such as Zhang in "Chinese Strategic Culture," have also pointed out. Johnston's reliance on the seven military classics, first of all, produces a focus on the military strategies and tactics of how to fight a war once it has started. These classics do not focus on grand strategy. Second, the cases that he uses to test his theory focus mostly on military generals. Third, the Ming Dynasty, which he uses as a case study, was a particularly belligerent time period. The Mongols invaded the Han people's southern Song from the after the of the a the border of the Ming was constantly by of the border by the Ming was and because there were the other the Ming was in and the Mongols to to the from the Therefore, the Ming have a time of Some scholars, however, that the Han offensive as a result of the Han Chinese the Great was of offensive than a defensive it was to territory. See China and University Press, was that the Han was particularly aggressive in Therefore, Johnston to use other such as the Yuan, or as his he have his I Johnston's case however, on his of strategic culture, which military In some of Johnston's of Chinese some Chinese from example, one in Chinese can have and can be into The with a can or means or the of may some may result in a In of Cultural Realism, for example, Johnston of Chinese as offensive or in some Chinese reflect the for the or some of the strategies are to unless by the use of the fight against the in the of an to Mao's war strategy in the war against the If Mao's strategies of and for example, are as to offensive means, into Mao's that he is to be an offensive C. The Operational of the (New York: C. A Study of Press, and L. "The A to the Study of Political and Decision International Studies R. "The as an to the of report to the National Science no. Stephen G. Walker, "The between and Operational and the War," of Conflict no. 1 Cultural Realism: L. "The between and in Psychological in International Politics, ed. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview, Stephen G. Walker, "The of Political International Studies 27, no. 2 and Stephen G. Walker, "The of Operational Political no. 2 1990): of the Study of Walker, and Walker, of Operational Operational of the Study of and Iain Johnston, about Strategic Culture," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): He the same argument in Cultural Realism, Study of "The Walker, and Walker, of Operational between and and Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational Cultural Realism: strategy on political and among other see Johnston, Cultural Realism: G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, for Operational International Studies no. 1 1998): Schafer, and Young, See also Robert "The Concept of Science no. 3 (July John and "The Bases of Social in Studies in Social ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Charles A. to The and of in International Politics, ed. (New York: Charles A. Theory and International System (New York: about of Conflict no. 1 "The Power of World Politics 24, no. 1 (October and Social American Political Science Review no. 4 1978): and World Politics: New and World Politics no. 2 (January and Power: A International Organization no. 4 (autumn and Steven ed., York: New University Press, VICS is a computer software program for content analysis on in a leader's The are with a to of a leader's view of the political and for four or See Stephen G. Walker, the Political of with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Social Science Automation, 2000); Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational and Michael D. Young, with in of ed. Mark D. by Charles for the World Survey is a system of during a political Operational program in the Profiler+ with a of that those such as The that I out after the by Mao such as Chinese and Chinese those are as in Mao's When working out the was from Mark Schafer of State University and Michael D. Young of Social Science Automation, The of and and include the Conflict See Charles A. and D. Patterns in the among in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A in and (New York: The VICS over has these their and other by hand to building the about "The Power of and Social and World and and between and for and which between and and are by 3 to the Schafer, and Young, and Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders," in The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, ed. Jerrold M. Post Arbor: University of Michigan Press, of is a of the of of in a to the of for a with the same of and the same of and (New York: the Political of and Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational VICS method about a leader's operational code beliefs from or other public by the But for the of the state's behavior is the public Mark Schafer, in Psychological at a An to the Political 21, no. 3 Schafer of selection public and public in about beliefs from the public of leaders. he that public can be for leaders' at a because the public of public beliefs and public behavior. See also in The for and on University of Press, using a much of a longer time results that support my argument more The for only one of the four that Johnston in his in the of is that the others are out of the time for the Korean War test case or for content analysis with VICS on for of Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational and Operational and and and Operational and in Psychological Assessment of Political Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational 215–45. I using the same as The foreign policy by Mao are from the version of Mao's available at and at I validity as defined by and to see the actual among of one should be G. and A. Reliability and Validity Sage, for the were by Mark Schafer of the of Political State University, The at the time this article was by world leaders. from the in 2 and 2 are from the leader's raw to from the for the is and are in was not for Mao as a and for China as a the War the war between the and the after the of China was the domestic was by no means to the Korean War, however, these domestic sources of did not as a to the of the nation and Mao's that China the out of for Whiting, China Crosses the In his recent study, this and argues that Mao's and personality and China's domestic were the China's to on argues that the Chinese was of the of the North Korean to the the were not to the Chinese leaders after the North the from Soviet sources also shows that a in the Chinese into China was more on to its than on with a as by its in China to the Korean War Whiting, China Crosses the Although there is no that Mao's strategic for a war with the in Korea that war have a defensive war of not an offensive war of See China's to the Korean War: The of the (New York: Columbia University Press, Mao's China and the Cold War University of North Press, 2001); and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military China and the Korean War University of Press, 1995). a Chinese see and "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," China and Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Strategic in the of Cold War Studies no. 2 (spring Schafer, and Young, and Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, Operational Codes and the of Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War of Conflict no. 5 (October 1999): "China's Security Policy in the Post–Cold War no. 2 (summer 1992): "China's Use of "Realism(s) and Chinese Security "A on China's Strategic Culture and War," State University, May "Is China a Status Quo Power?" provides a in on is a in the of Political Science at State

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