Atomic Signaling

Exploring Likelihood of Success and Military Necessity through the Bargaining Model of War

Bibliographic Data

ID6129391
AuthorsJon Askonas (corresponding author), Joshua Hastey (0000-0003-4548-4603)
Year2024
Volume22
Issue2
Pages73-87
Publication date2024-04-02
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Review of Faith & International Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1931-7743 • E-ISSN: 1557-0274
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/15570274.2024.2335065
OpenAlexW4396932199
LanguageEN
References cited14

Did the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II meet the military necessity and likelihood of success criteria of the Just War Theory? Many scholars and ethicists have argued that they did not. We examine the decision through the rationalist models of war preferred by international relations theorists. We introduce a simple version of the bargaining model of war and tease out its essential differences with the models of war (and, therefore, military necessity) used by most Just War Theorists. Then, we reconstruct the decision to drop the bomb on Japan, focusing especially on information states, preference sets, and operational realities, to show that, if the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not meet military necessity and likelihood of success criteria, no other kind of military activity can

Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Military Defense Systems Analysis · Psychology

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