False Choice Between Pro-Russian and Non-Nuclear Iran

This study is intended as an attempt to prove the thesis: despite Iran’s pro-Russian foreign policy, it is in Russia’s interests to maintain Iran’s non-nuclear status. In the previous article, the authors examined to what extent modern Iran can be considered pro-Russian and whether their relationship qualifies for a strategic partnership. The second article describes five scenarios around Iran’s nuclear program: a new agreement, tougher sanctions, withdrawal from the NPT, a military conflict, and Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Negotiations deprive Iran’s opponents of the incentive to use force, and Iran of developing a deterrent. Moderate sanctions strengthen Iran’s motivation to cooperate with Moscow, but excessive restrictions can trigger the remaining scenarios, fraught with unpredictable consequences. Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT would force Moscow to weigh conflicting incentives: to support the non-proliferation regime or to maintain friendly relations with Iran. Iranian nuclear weapons would not threaten Russia but increase the risks of their accidental use. A war in Iran would destabilize the situation in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia, with consequences for the predominantly Muslim regions of Russia. The choice between a pro-Russian and a non-nuclear Iran is false: both a complementary foreign policy by Tehran and its lack of nuclear weapons are in Russia’s interests. Russia will find it more difficult to negotiate with a nuclear Iran, have to consider the risks of an accidental use within the range of Iranian missiles, as well as reassess the threat if and when the form of government changes in Tehran

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