How Constitutions Constrain
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6141033 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Susan Albert (corresponding author), Susan Alberts (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 127-143 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4159 • E-ISSN: 2151-6227 |
| Publisher | Comparative Politics CUNY (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5129/001041509x12911362971873 |
| OpenAlex | W3124457172 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
All democratic constitutions aim to regulate the exercise of political power according to democratic norms of behavior, and all establish institutions to reflect these norms. Nonetheless, respect for constitutional rules on the part of political actors in third wave democracies has varied greatly. Why do constitutions constrain the behavior of political actors more effectively in some cases than in others? What impact does this variation have on a country's prospects for institutionalizing democracy? Democracy is more likely to become institutionalized where powerful political actors operate within an incentive structure that encourages them to respect the democratic rules and procedures articulated in the constitution. From this perspective, a country's ability to institutionalize democracy is determined by the principal factors influencing political actors' compliance with democratic rules. Constitutional characteristics are one such factor, due to their primary role in establishing the ground rules for organizing politics and governance. The importance of rule compliance to democratic institutionalization has long been acknowledged. Constitutionalism defined as the widespread adherence to the democratic rules and norms contained in the constitution and other basic laws governing political life is a generally accepted requirement for democratic consolidation. In their comprehensive study of democratization, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan cite constitutionalism as a basic criterion of consolidation, adding that the existence of a Rechtsstaat (a state subject to law) is an indispensable reinforcing condition for constitutionalism. Without a government and state apparatus that act within the constraints of law, citizens would not be able fully to exercise their political rights, hindering democratic development.1 Other scholars have made this point using various formulations. These include calls for the development of liberal as opposed to electoral democracy, stronger commitment to democratic rules on the part of political elites, the elimination of perverse greater accountability, and the rule of law.2 Despite the recognition that constitutionalism is a basic criterion of democratic institutionalization, the development of constitutionalism has received scant attention. Numerous studies attribute success or failure in institutionalizing democracy to socioeconomic or cultural conditions. Others put the emphasis on agency and crafting on the part of political leaders.3 With the recent rediscovery of political institutions, a growing
Political science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies
| Citations per year | 0.36 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |