Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness
Not only Political but also Metaphysical
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6148581 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ferhat Taşkin (0009-0007-3922-5193, Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Pages | 953-965 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-23 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2757-6949 • E-ISSN: 2757-6957 |
| Publisher | Hitit University (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.14395/hid.1343310 |
| OpenAlex | W4390143489 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, ‘justice as fairness’ (JAF, henceforth). In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political (as well as moral in a specific sense) conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation ‘the original position’ and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind ‘The Veil of Ignorance’ which is the main feature of the original position. The parties (free and rational persons) who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law (the Law of Peoples) to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples (like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan) would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawls’s accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawls’s accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract
Economic Justice · Epistemology · Ignorance · Law and economics · Original position · Political science · Politics · Primary goods · Social contract · Sociology · Veil of ignorance · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Populism, Right-Wing Movements · Turkey's Politics and Society
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |