The value of the corporate governance canon on Chinese companies

Bibliographic Data

ID6153246
AuthorsBryane Michael (0000-0002-6624-250X, University of Oxford, corresponding author), Say-Hak Goo (University of Hong Kong)
Year2019
Volume6
Issue1
Pages20-42
Publication date2019-10-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Chinese Governance (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2381-2354 • E-ISSN: 2381-2346
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/23812346.2019.1676537
OpenAlexW2785561334
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited35

China has yet to import the corporate governance “canon” (generally accepted rules as promoting share holder value as well as minority shareholder and other stakeholders’ rights) into its Code of Corporate Governance. What effect would Chinese companies’ simply adopting such a canon – as defined by Hong Kong or other foreign corporate governance practices -- have on their share prices? We look at Mainland Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, looking at the way their share prices react to economic fluctuations when they have better or worse corporate governance practices. Using a differences-of-differences methodology, that such share prices could/would increase by around 7% -- increasing profits by about $330 billion. Yet, a significant part of the distribution of these companies loose money in the short-run. These results provide yet another confirmation that adopting the corporate governance canon can profit companies’ investors, but not all of them

Business · Canon · China · Corporate governance · Economics · Mainland China · Management · Political science · Profit (economics · Shareholder · Stakeholder · Value (mathematics · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Accounting · Finance

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub