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Imitation, network size, and efficiency

Bibliographic Data

ID6161599
AuthorsCarlos Alós-Ferrer (0000-0002-1668-9784, University of Zurich, corresponding author), Johannes Buckenmaier (0000-0002-2070-6647, University of Zurich), Federica Farolfi (Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences)
Year2020
Volume9
Issue1
Pages123-133
Publication date2020-12-04
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNetwork Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2050-1250 • E-ISSN: 2050-1242
PublisherCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/nws.2020.43
OpenAlexW3111779882
LanguageEN
References cited13

A number of theoretical results have provided sufficient conditions for the selection of payoff-efficient equilibria in games played on networks when agents imitate successful neighbors and make occasional mistakes (stochastic stability). However, those results only guarantee full convergence in the long-run, which might be too restrictive in reality. Here, we employ a more gradual approach relying on agent-based simulations avoiding the double limit underlying these analytical results. We focus on the circular-city model, for which a sufficient condition on the population size relative to the neighborhood size was identified by Alós-Ferrer & Weidenholzer [(2006) Economics Letters , 93 , 163–168]. Using more than 100,000 agent-based simulations, we find that selection of the efficient equilibrium prevails also for a large set of parameters violating the previously identified condition. Interestingly, the extent to which efficiency obtains decreases gradually as one moves away from the boundary of this condition

Convergence (economics · Economics · Focus (optics · Imitation · Limit (mathematics · Machine learning · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Physics · Population · Population size · Selection (genetic algorithm · Stability (learning theory · Stochastic game · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence

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