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Un modelo sobre competencia en mercados de electricidad

Contratos bilaterales en Colombia

Bibliographic Data

ID6166586
AuthorsAlex Pérez (0000-0002-5672-3916, Universidad EAFIT), Jaime Carabalí (0000-0003-4755-0096, Icesi University)
Year2021
Issue87
Pages149-185
Publication date2021-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRevista Desarrollo y Sociedad (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0120-3584 • E-ISSN: 1900-7760
PublisherUniversidad de los Andes (PUBLISHER • VE)
DOI10.13043/dys.87.5
OpenAlexW3134347627
LanguageES
References cited18

In this paper, we elaborate a theoretical model to explain how generating firms choose their aggregate position in bilateral contracts in the Colombian electricity market. Subsequently, we propose an empirical strategy to contrast the theoretical predictions of the model with data from the wholesale market. Our results show that there is evidence in favor of the hypotheses of our model. Firms tend to adjust their contracts according to the ideal generation they expect the market operator to allocate them, and the difference between marginal costs and contract prices

Political science · Electric Power System Optimization · EU Law and Policy Analysis · Merger and Competition Analysis

  • Trading Forward in an Imperfect Market

    Andrew Powell•The Economic Journal•1993

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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