Redistricting by Formula
An Ohio Reform Experiment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180199 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Melissa Altman (0000-0001-7382-6960, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author), Micah Altman, Michael P Mcdonald (0000-0002-3717-4405, University of Florida), Michael Mcdonald (0000-0002-4063-4441) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 103-131 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Politics Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673x17700611 |
| OpenAlex | W3122192783 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 31 |
In the last decade, Ohio reformers advocated redistricting by formula: selecting the redistricting plan that scores best on a predefined objective scoring function that combines prima facie neutral criteria with political goals of plan fairness and district competition. In the post-2010 redistricting, these reformers hosted a public competition where prizes were awarded to the best legal plan scored on the reformers’ formula. The submitted plans provide a unique opportunity to evaluate how redistricting by formula may work in practice. Our analysis finds the public yields a broader range of redistricting plans, on indicia of legal and public policy interest, than developed by the state legislature. The Pareto frontier reveals plans that perform better than the legislature’s adopted plan on one and two dimensions, as well as the reformers’ overall scoring function. Our evaluation reveals minimal trade-offs among the components of the overall competition’s scoring criteria, but we caution that the scoring formula may be sensitive to implementation choices among its components. Compared with the legislature’s plan, the reform community can get more of the four criteria they value; importantly, without sacrificing the state’s only African American opportunity congressional district
Legislature · Political science · Politics · Redistricting · Representativeness heuristic · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
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Black representation and district compactness in Southern congressional districts
Finding Pareto Dominant Redistricting Plans Using DEA
Ninety-Nine Chambers and the Development of Comparative Legislative Studies
Evaluating Legislative Districts Using Measures of Partisan Bias and Simulations
Elbridge Gerry's Salamander
Black Votes Count
The Nature of Rationality
Unintentional Gerrymandering
How to gerrymander
The memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren
Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting
Partisan Consequences of the Post-1990 Redistricting for the U.S. House of Representatives
Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering
Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans
The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s
Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation
Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation
Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting Reform
Partisan and Incumbency Effects of 1970s Congressional Redistricting
The Effect of Majority-Minority Mandates on Partisan Gerrymandering
Drawing the Line on District Competition
Assessing South Carolina's 1990s congressional districting
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems
On the Prevention of Gerrymandering
Equal Votes, Equal Money
Urban and Rural Representation and State Legislative Apportionment
Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting
A Theory of Political Districting
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |