Congress and the Railroads

Federalism, American Political Development, and the Migration of Policy Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID6180215
AuthorsZachary Callen (0000-0002-9671-2787, Allegheny College, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume40
Issue2
Pages293-326
Publication date2012-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Politics Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1532673x11427072
OpenAlexW2063425822
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited58

This article argues that American federalism led both to a greater national role in rail promotion and more centralized railroads in the antebellum period. Local competition among states led Congressional representatives from state unable to build local railroads to turn to federal assistance. Early support for railroads came from representatives in the South and frontier, who were primarily drawn into rail coalitions because of their own inability to build local rail networks. However, over time, competition among states within the coalition as well as concerns about federal power led many initial members of the coalition to drop out. In their place, states that favored a stronger federal state stepped into the coalition and subsequently built a more nationally oriented rail system. This analysis argues that the shifting of policies from local control to national oversight due to local resource shortages is an important aspect of American states building

Business · Economic shortage · Economics · Federalism · Frontier · Political economy · Political science · Politics · American Constitutional Law and Politics · American History and Culture · Canadian Identity and History · Law · Public Administration

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