Comparing Ideal Points Across Institutions and Time
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180285 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shawn Treier (0000-0002-2805-5623, University of Minnesota, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 804-831 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Politics Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673x11401816 |
| OpenAlex | W2088129086 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 29 |
Many spatial theories of policymaking in the context of a system of checks and balances require the estimation of ideal points which are comparable across institutions. This analysis evaluates comparisons between the president, Senate, and House. For applications which presume that legislators change their positions over time, the most commonly used estimates impose too many restrictions on the ideal points. I consider an alternative approach to creating a common scale by using interest groups (American Conservative Union [ACU] and Americans for Democratic Action [ADA]) as reference actors and incorporating “bridge votes,” roll calls on which the House and Senate vote on identical text. The analysis demonstrates this approach can produce comparable estimates across time and chamber
Democracy · Geography · Ideal point · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Mathematics · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Spatial and Panel Data Analysis
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior
Dealing With Human Rights in International Organizations
Explaining Differences in Voting Patterns across Voting Domains Using Hierarchical Bayesian Models
Estimating the Conflict Dimensionality in the German Länder from Vote Advice Applications, 2014–2017
Multiple Ideal Points
Anchors Away
Constituency preferences and MP preferences
Assessing the applicability of vote advice applications for estimating party positions
Formal Comparisons of Legislative Institutions
Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics
How electoral systems affect MPs' positions
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Setting the Agenda
Party Influence in Congress
Legislative Leviathan
Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
Pivotal Politics
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
Legislator voting and shirking
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Changing minds? Not in Congress
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers
Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate
Lawmaking and Roll Calls
Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock
Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study
Comparing Legislators and Legislatures
Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-Nominate Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap
Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap
Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency
When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
Patterns of Congressional Voting
The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96
Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,79 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |