The Freedom(s) within Collective Agency

Tuomela and Sartre

Bibliographic Data

ID6180479
AuthorsBasil Vassilicos (0000-0002-2615-4417, Immaculata University, corresponding author)
Year2020
Publication date2020-04-08
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueBulletin d Analyse Phénoménologique (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1782-2041
PublisherUniversity of Liege (PUBLISHER • BE)
DOI10.25518/1782-2041.1164
OpenAlexW3015819540
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited12

In this paper, the goal is to investigate the nature of freedom enjoyed by participants in collective agency. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions: in what respects are participants in collective agency able to exercise freedom in some weaker or stronger sense? In what ways is such collective or common freedom distinct from the freedom ascribed to individuals? Might there be different sorts of freedoms involved in and tolerated by collective agency, each of which has its own role in determining the nature and efficacy of the bond uniting its participants? Clarification of just what such freedom may involve and how it subsists within collective agency is not only important for being able to demonstrate the instrumental value of social ontology to contemporary political debates. It may likewise contribute an important dimension to the descriptive psychology of collective agency and shared intentionality, which is an approach deserving of more attention. Here, such clarification is undertaken via a comparison to the notions of freedom at stake in the respective accounts of sociality and collective agency provided by Raimo Tuomela and Jean-Paul Sartre

Collective action · Collective responsibility · Epistemology · Individualism · Political science · Politics · Sense of agency · Social ontology · Social science · Sociality · Sociology · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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