Local Government Access to Funds—It Is about Who Your Friends and Party Are

Bibliographic Data

ID6180776
AuthorsEdvin Zhllima (0000-0002-9054-9878, Agricultural University of Tirana Faculty of Economics and Agribusiness Tirana, Albania and Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) Prague, Czech Republic), Elvina Merkaj (0000-0002-2776-812X, Marche Polytechnic University), Drini Imami (0000-0002-4716-792X, Agricultural University of Tirana Faculty of Economics and Agribusiness Tirana, Albania and Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) Prague, Czech Republic), Klodjan Rama (Agricultural University of Tirana Faculty of Agriculture and Environment Tirana, Albania)
Year2020
Volume53
Issue1
Pages135-151
Publication date2020-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCommunist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920
PublisherUniversity of California Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1525/cpcs.2020.53.1.135
OpenAlexW3015706842
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited19

The competitive grants schemes, a financing mechanism established for achieving social welfare as well as balanced and efficient territorial development, would have to be applied through a transparent and objective competition process. However, political influence of the ruling party and informal networks with central government decision-makers may influence access to competitive grants. This paper explores the extent to which the political affiliation and the personal informal connections/networks of the Municipalities and Communes leaders influence the allocation of competitive grants in Albania. The study is based on their perceptions and attitudes collected through the application of qualitative research instruments. We used a semi-structured survey that targeted local government leaders in Albania during the year 2013–14. Research shows that local government leaders are more likely to access grants from the central government if both belong to the same political party/coalition, follow personal informal connections/networks, and can use strong (political and/or bribing) lobbying with high-level decision makers

Business · Economics · Local government · Market economy · Perception · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Welfare · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Capital and Networks

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