Small-Time Clientelism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180856 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aurelian Giugăl (0000-0003-3895-4697, Interdisciplinary Center of Advanced Research on Territorial Dynamics, University of Bucharest, Romania), Ion Matei Costinescu (Center for the Study of Modernity and the Rural World Romania) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 25-46 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Communist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920 |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1525/cpcs.2020.53.2.25 |
| OpenAlex | W3047328494 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 38 |
The extant literature on clientelism has tended to focus on large parties. This article asks what happens to small parties that operate in an electoral system dominated by large clientelistic parties. Our case study is the Romanian National Liberal Party (PNL). During the last two decades, it has become the second-largest party in Romania. This is unusual because the liberals in post-communist countries are politically weak. The main base of liberal support is typically urban middle classes. By contrast, PNL's electoral base is in the economically underdeveloped rural world. Using electoral statistics, economic datasets, and qualitative analysis, we demonstrate that PNL's success was due to pork-barrel spending and the development of clientelistic networks in which local mayors play a key role. PNL was able to grow by following the example of the dominant parties and creating networks of loyal mayors. In turn, this opens perspectives for research about clientelism in small communities, as well as comparative studies based on small parties
Clientelism · Communism · Extant taxon · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Romanian · Sociology · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration
Election goals and income redistribution
Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The two faces of infrastructure investment
Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism
Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist East-Central Europe
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
Vote Buying in Argentina
The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina
Resurrection of the successor parties and democratization in East-Central Europe
Pressure, Favours, and Vote-buying
Three Days in Bucharest
Patriotic Left-Centrism
Going for a Safe Vote
Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society
Bringing home the bacon
Party Organization and the Political Success of the Communist Successor Parties
The Romanian Revolution of December 1989
Workings of the State
Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties
Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe
Throwing out the Bums
Partisan Pork Barrel in Parliamentary Systems
Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies
Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine
The exploitative function of party patronage
Effective Opposition Strategies
The Core Voter’s Curse
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Pork‐Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94
Poor People's Politics
Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support
The sleep has been rubbed from their eyes
Clientelism and the personal vote in Indonesia
Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party
How Public Spending is Fuelling Electoral Strategies in Romania
Friends, Followers, and Factions
Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |