Why politicians want constitutional courts

The Russian case

Bibliographic Data

ID6181302
AuthorsCarla Thorson (University of California, Los Angeles), Carla L Thorson (University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume37
Issue2
Pages187-211
Publication date2004-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCommunist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920
PublisherUniversity of California Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.03.003
OpenAlexW2036593348
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited5

Why are judicial review mechanisms being incorporated into so many democratizing states? This study analyzes why politicians create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. It sheds light on the role constitutional courts play in the consolidation phase of a democratic transition, focusing on one of those countries with no tradition of independent judicial review or of democratic forms of governance—Russia. Past practices and historical precedent do not support the formation of an independent judiciary in Russia, and yet a potentially powerful constitutional court now exists. Moreover, during the course of the transition from the Soviet state to the Russian Republic, there were three attempts to create an independent judicial review mechanism only one of which could be termed a success. This analysis focuses on the self-interested calculations of politicians in forming each of these three institutions, demonstrating that political actors establish a constitutional court to enhance their democratic credibility

Constitution · Constitutional court · Constitutional review · Credibility · Democracy · Economics · Judicial activism · Judicial Independence · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · European and International Law Studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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