Rapacious individualism and political competition in Ukraine, 1992—2004
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6181392 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lucan A Way (0000-0001-9702-9034, Department of Political Science, Temple University, 1115 W Berks Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122 6089, USA E-mail address: [email protected], corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Publication date | 2005-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Communist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920 |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.03.004 |
| OpenAlex | W2074627814 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 8 |
This article examines one reason for the failure of full-scale authoritarianism in Ukraine, 1992e2004. The monopolization of political control in Ukraine was partially thwarted by the disorganization of Ukraine’s ex-nomenklatura elite that dominated the country after the Cold War. Elite Ukrainian politics in the 1990s can best be understood as an example of ‘‘rapacious individualism.’’ This term was used by Martin Shefter to describe pre-machine New York city politics in the 19th century, dominated by a non-ideological and unstructured competition for power and rents. Rapacious individualism in Ukraine had a contradictory impact. It hindered full-scale democratization but also undermined efforts to consolidate authoritarianism. At one level, widespread corruption allowed the executive to concentrate political power because he controlled key patronage resources. At the same time, weak organization reduced the costs of open confrontation with the executive while corruption distributed resources to a broad range of future opposition leaders. The result was competitive authoritarian rule
Authoritarianism · Democracy · Democratization · Economic rent · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Ideology · Individualism · Market economy · Monopolization · Monopoly · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion and Society Interactions · Soviet and Russian History
Ukraine, Russia and new wars
Learning from past experience
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The Orange Revolution
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Electoral Rules and Legislative Parties in the Ukrainian Rada
Party politics after the colour revolutions
Reforms in the judiciary of Ukraine
The Flexible Few
Acts of Negotiation
| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,89 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |