Creating an Angel
Congressional Delegation to Ad Hoc Commissions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6182908 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Colton C Campbell (Florida International University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 161-182 |
| Publication date | 1998-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Congress & the Presidency (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/07343469809507800 |
| OpenAlex | W2042214866 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 24 |
Congress has historically delegated authority to "angels" to accomplish ends the Congress could not. An increasingly popular form of congressional delegation has been to entrust temporary, independent advisory bodies to render nonpartisan recommendations and advice. Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain what motivates Congress to delegate, and few of these focus on delegation to ad hoc commissions. Most portray delegation as an advantageous way for legislators to favor constituents or shift blame in order to maximize benefits and minimize losses. Others hypothesize that desired outcomes can be achieved only by delegating authority to someone else. This perspective outlines the need to delegate as a principal- agent issue, suggesting that notable benefits, like collective action, are realized through organizations. While each perspective provides some clues as to why Congress will cede authority over policy making to an ad hoc commission, neither fully captures every decision to delegate. However, according to the architects of commissions, not every commission is created with the expectation of doing what members want to avoid or want to do but not openly. The varied reasons suggested in interviews and the resulting commissions may be classified in three basic categories: to take advantage of expertise that is unavailable through standard institutional resources or prohibitively costly to obtain; to shift the blame for unpopular decisions; and, a third factor which does not appear in existing literature, to keep legislators' workloads manageable
Blame · Business · Commission · Computer security · Delegate · Delegated authority · Delegation · Economics · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Principal (computer security · Public relations · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology
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| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |