The Constitutional Agency of the Vice Presidency

Bibliographic Data

ID6183099
AuthorsJordan T Cash (0000-0003-1341-4096, Political Science, Baylor University, Waco, Texas, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume49
Issue3
Pages329-362
Publication date2022-09-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCongress & the Presidency (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07343469.2021.1964640
OpenAlexW4223618418
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited29

The vice presidency is often viewed as constitutionally devoid of any importance or power. Most research on the vice presidency argues that it is only as the vice presidency moved into the executive branch and became more tied to the president that the office gained significance. Yet this significance has come at the cost of the vice presidency’s agency. Vice presidents are more powerful now, but also more subordinate to the president. By drawing out the theory underlying the structure, duties, and powers of the vice presidency, I demonstrate that the Constitution positions the vice president to be an independent institutional actor with the capacity for autonomous action apart from the president and Congress. Furthermore, the vice president’s potential for acting with agency remains salient despite subsequent constitutional amendments and changes in political practices. Indeed, I argue that the development of the modern vice presidency has created tensions at odds with the office’s underlying constitutional structure and authority.Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1964640

Agency (philosophy · Constitution · Economics · Inherent powers · Management · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Separation of powers · Sociology · Vice president · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Theory and Influence

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