Presidential Power Denied

A New Model of Veto Overrides Using Political Time

Bibliographic Data

ID6183166
AuthorsDavid Bridges (0000-0003-3013-8628), David Bridge (Baylor University, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume41
Issue2
Pages149-166
Publication date2014-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCongress & the Presidency (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07343469.2014.894155
OpenAlexW2024310556
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited43

This article uses presidential veto overrides as a site upon which to test whether the context of "political time" acts as a determinant of institutional politics. Using an original database, I transpose political time theory to the study of the veto process. While the concept of political time has mainly been used in qualitative case studies, I argue that it also allows for large N testing. Because political time creates observable measurements, it can be used to explore various institutional outcomes. One such institutional site is overrides. With this in mind, I pit political time against the standard variables in the vetoes literature (e.g., approval, divided government). Finding that political time is a significant determinant of overrides, the article discusses how the theory fits with the existing literature. The article concludes with the broader implications of more widely incorporating political time—as a quantitative independent variable—into the study of American political institutions

Biology · Context (archaeology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Presidential system · Sociology · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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