Blessing or Curse
The Effects of Earmarked Funding in Unicef and UNDP
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6189452 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lisa Schmid (0000-0003-0746-1195), Lisa Katharina Schmid, Alexander Reitzenstein, Nina Hall (0000-0002-6318-9029, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Bologna Italy) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 433-459 |
| Publication date | 2021-09-29 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Global Governance A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1075-2846 • E-ISSN: 1942-6720 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1163/19426720-02703002 |
| OpenAlex | W3202705448 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 15 |
Earmarked funding to international organizations (IO s) has increased significantly over the past two decades. International relations scholars have examined the causes of this trend, but know less about its effects on UN entities. This article identifies different types of earmarked funding, varying from low to high discretion delegated to IO s. Secondly, it examines trends in the UN Development Programme and UN Children’s Fund and finds that both have significant proportions of earmarked funding with low discretion. Drawing on thirty interviews, the article notes four implications of tightly earmarked financing: 1) higher transaction costs for IO s; 2) less predictable funding; 3) overhead costs that are rarely covered; and 4) increasing competition for financing. Overall, the article highlights that earmarked financing exists on a spectrum from tight to minimal control by donor states, and this has important implications for multilateralism
Business · Curse · Discretion · Economics · International economics · International law · Multilateralism · Political science · Politics · Public international law · Sociology · Transaction cost · Waiver · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration · Finance
Earmarked Funding and the Performance of International Organizations
Field Presence and the Performance of Environmental Projects
Siloes of influence
Home turf
Flexibly funding WHO? An analysis of its donors’ voluntary contributions
Does earmarked funding affect the performance of international organisations
Trust funds and the sub-national effectiveness of development aid
Understanding Resourcing Trade-offs in International Organizations
Walking the Walk, Not Talking the Talk
Following the Money and the Law
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
Informal state influence in international organizations
A blessing or a curse? The role of money in shaping international health governance
Delegation under anarchy
The logic of delegation
Money and multilateralism
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round
Collusion in International Organizations
The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds
Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats
Aid Modalities Matter
Multilateral Cooperation and Congress
The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and United Nations Agencies
Which Donors, Which Funds? Bilateral Donors' Choice of Multilateral Funds at the World Bank
Delegation to International Organizations
Multilateralism
Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization
Theorizing the role of executive heads in international organizations
| Citations per year | 4.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |