Practices, Norms and Recognition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6190842 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Titus Stahl (0000-0001-6537-2196, Institute of Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Grüneburgplatz 1 60629 Frankfurt a. M. Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 10-21 |
| Publication date | 2007-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Human Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.2478/v10023-007-0002-0 |
| OpenAlex | W2027649683 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
Practices, Norms and Recognition The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following
Collectivism · Criticism · Dilemma · Epistemology · Individualism · Normative · Political science · Social dilemma · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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