Causation without the causal theory of action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6190993 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elena Popa (0000-0002-0494-1401, Department of Humanities and Languages FLAME University Pune , Maharashtra India, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 389-393 |
| Publication date | 2022-10-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Human Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/humaff-2022-0032 |
| OpenAlex | W4307985618 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation (of all sorts) has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version of Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better
Causal analysis · Causal inference · Causal model · Causation · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Incompatibilism · Indeterminism · Inference · Mathematical economics · Mathematics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |