Multiple explanation

A consider-an-alternative strategy for debiasing judgments

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6203538
AutoresEdward R Hirt (0000-0002-5346-9748, Indiana University), Keith D Markman (0000-0001-5831-0237)
Año1995
Volumen69
Número6
Páginas1069-1086
Fecha de publicación1995-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
EditorialAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1069
OpenAlexW2075078671
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas56
Referencias citadas33

Previous research has suggested that an effective strategy for debiasing judgments is to have participants "consider the opposite." The present research proposes that considering any plausible alternative outcome for an event, not just the opposite outcome, leads participants to simulate multiple alternatives, resulting in debiased judgments. Three experiments tested this hypothesis using an explanation task paradigm. Participants in all studies were asked to explain either 1 hypothetical outcome (single explanation conditions) or 2 hypothetical outcomes (multiple explanation conditions) to an event; after the explanation task, participants made likelihood judgments. The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicated that debiasing occurred in all multiple explanation conditions, including those that did not involve the opposite outcome. Furthermore, the findings indicated that debiased judgments resulted from participants' spontaneous consideration of additional alternatives in making their likelihood judgments. The results of Study 3 also identified the perceived plausibility of the explained alternative as an important moderating variable in debiasing

Cognitive psychology · Debiasing · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology