Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6205628
AutoresBoris Maciejovsky (0000-0003-3195-0802, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), David V Budescu (0000-0001-9613-0317)
Año2007
Volumen92
Número5
Páginas854-870
Fecha de publicación2007-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
EditorialAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.854
PMID17484609
OpenAlexW2150703294
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas14

There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction

Common value auction · Economics · Group (periodic table) · Group decision-making · Incentive · Microeconomics · Pooling · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Stochastic game · Task (project management) · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Open Source Software Innovations · Psychology · Social Psychology