Bicameral Negotiations

The Navette System in France

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6226856
AutoresGeorge Tsebelis (0000-0003-0889-8153, University of California, Los Angeles), John Money (0000-0003-2390-3125, University of California, Los Angeles), Jeannette Money
Ano1995
Volume25
Fascículo1
Páginas101-129
Data de publicação1995-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoBritish Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0007123400007080
OpenAlexW1993068661
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas28
Referências citadas20

This article investigates the decision-making process in the French bicameral legislature: the navette system. In this system, the legislation shuttles between the two houses until agreement is reached or until a stopping rule is applied. We examine the interaction between upper and lower houses as a bargaining game with complete and one-sided incomplete information.The complete information model permits us to evaluate the political implications of the navette's various institutional features (where the bill is first introduced, number of iterations, final veto power, etc.). The incomplete information approach permits us to predict the duration of the navette process. Data from the French Fifth Republic in the 1959–86 period corroborate the conclusions of the model. Because the navette system is the most commonly used method of decision making in bicameral legislatures, the model can be usefully generalized to other countries

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