Presidents Have Problems Too
The Logic of Intra-branch Delegation in East Asian Democracies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6227202 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeeyang Rhee Baum (University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 659-684 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123407000361 |
| OpenAlex | W2116040683 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
This article addresses the codification of formal rules and procedures of governance through Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs). The recent enactment of APAs in two new democracies, South Korea and Taiwan, highlights an apparent paradox. Because administrative reform limits the executive's power, it is clear why legislatures in separation-of-power systems would favour APAs. But it is less clear why presidents would support them. Why would a president accept a law designed to restrict her ability to act freely? The answer is that presidents have agency problems too. The more intra-branch conflict they face during their administrations, the more likely they will support administrative reform. Thus, instead of tying the hands of future administrations, presidents also use APAs to overcome current control problems. Three recently democratized East Asian countries, two with APAs (South Korea and Taiwan) and one without (Philippines), support this ‘reining in’ theory. Conflict within the executive branch may be an important ingredient in democratic consolidation. APAs result from political struggle
Agency (philosophy · Consolidation (business · Corporate governance · Delegation · Democracy · Democratic consolidation · Democratization · Divided government · Economics · Executive power · Legislature · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Sociology · Tying · Accounting · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Ombudsman and Human Rights · Public Administration
Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats
Delegation, Agenda Control, and Budget Reform in Brazil, 1999–2008
Slowing at Sunset
Breaking Authoritarian Bonds
Legislative Hearings and Presidential Cabinet Management
Making Rules about Rulemaking
Constraining a Shadowy Future
Delegation Dilemmas
Reining in the Bureaucrats
The impact of bureaucratic openness on public trust in South Korea
Bureaucratic Discretion and the Regulatory Burden
The enactment of public participation in rulemaking
| Citations per year | 0.57 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Highly cited | No |