The Rush to Personalize
Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6228209 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joan C Timoneda (0000-0001-7057-872X, Purdue University West Lafayette, autor correspondente), Abel Escribà‐folch (0000-0001-7344-1585, Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals), John Chin (0000-0001-5318-6062, Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Ano | 2023 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 878-901 |
| Data de publicação | 2023-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123422000655 |
| OpenAlex | W4323668994 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 14 |
| Referências citadas | 79 |
How do failed coups influence power personalization in dictatorships? While scholars have studied the mechanisms of personalism in dictatorships in detail, little attention has been paid to the timing and determinants of surges in personalism levels. In this article, we propose that personalism can evolve non-linearly, and show that large, quite rapid increases in personalization by dictators occur after a failed coup attempt. The logic is that failed coups are information-revealing events that provide the dictator with strong motives and ample opportunities to accumulate power. The leader uses this window of opportunity to rapidly consolidate his power at the expense of the ruling coalition. We test the theory using time-series, cross-sectional data on dictatorships in 114 countries in the period between 1946 and 2010. Two placebo tests indicate that disruptive events by regime outsiders – failed assassination attempts and civil war onsets – do not promote the rush to personalize
Business · Democracy · Dictator · Dictatorship · Economics · Personalism · Personalization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Marketing · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion and Society Interactions
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond
Governing for Growth? Economic Performance and Finance Minister Survival in Democracies and Autocracies
Revisiting the Personalism and Economic Performance Debate
Change for the sake of continuity? Élite politics in post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan (2019–2023)
Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups
Authoritarian personalism, institutional constraints, and plebiscitary rule
Elite Threats and Punitive Violence in Autocratic Regimes
Personalization and Elite Rhetoric
Foreign aid, FDI and the personalization of power in autocracies
The trajectories of personalization
Leaders’ experience and the transition from populism to dictatorship
The dictator’s legionnaires
The Rush to Personalize
Coups and refugee flows in autocracies and democracies
The Democratic Coup d'État
Libya since Independence
A History of Algeria
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Seizing Power
Using Synthetic Controls
Sultanistic Regimes
How Dictatorships Work
When Soldiers Rebel
Constraining Dictatorship
The Logic of Political Survival
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Are coups good for democracy
Reanalysis
Are coups good for democracy? A response to Miller (2016)
The Transformation of the Power Structure and Security in Libya
Deterring threats and settling scores
Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
The rise and ‘thermidorianization’ of racial praetorianism in Benin
The Global Rise of Personalized Politics
Continuity in Sierra Leone
The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression
North Africa
Libyan Sandstorm
Algeria
Restructuring an authoritarian state
Ethnic groups in conflict
The Durability of Client Regimes
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
The Differential Effects of “Democratic” Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships
No Easy Way Out
The Morning After
Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships
The latent characteristics that structure autocratic rule
External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes
Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions
Which Way Out
Even Generals Need Friends
Coordination, Learning, and Coups
Preventing Coups d’état
Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups
The Rise Predicts the Fall
Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy
Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of Intervention
The Varieties of Coups D’état
Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict
Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
Economic interdependence and post-coup democratization
A question of trust
Institutions as Signals
Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule
Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years
Economic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization
Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes
Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method
Making It Personal
The Rush to Personalize
Coups and Democracy
War Makes the Regime
Security, development, and force
Failed coups, democratization, and authoritarian entrenchment
The Enemy Within
The Study of Critical Junctures
The Economic Costs of Conflict
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa
Introducing Archigos
Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état
Strongmen and Straw Men
Operation 'Just Missed
Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations
| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 4,67 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 14 |