Gone with the Wind

Federalism and the Strategic Location of Air Polluters

Bibliographic Data

ID6229366
AuthorsJames E Monogan (0000-0002-1968-6052, University of Georgia), David M Konisky (0000-0002-1146-3938, Indiana University), Nathan D Woods (0000-0001-8556-4769, University of South Carolina), Neal D Woods
Year2017
Volume61
Issue2
Pages257-270
Publication date2017-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12278
OpenAlexW3123381178
LanguageEN
Citations received22
References cited47

In federal systems, both state governments and firms have incentives to strategically locate polluting facilities where the environmental and health consequences will be borne as much as possible by residents of other jurisdictions. We analyze air polluter location in the United States using a spatial point pattern model, which models where events occur in latitude and longitude. Our analyses indicate that major air polluters are significantly more likely to be located near a state's downwind border than a control group of other industrial facilities, results that are robust to a wide variety of model specifications and measurement strategies. This effect is particularly pronounced for facilities with toxic air emissions. The observed pattern of polluter location varies systematically across states and time in ways that suggest it is responsive to public policy at both the national and state levels

Business · Economics · Environmental planning · Federalism · Geography · Incentive · Location · Microeconomics · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · Variety (cybernetics · Air Quality and Health Impacts · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Law · Spatial and Panel Data Analysis

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