Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6229403
AutoresJessica Di Salvatore (0000-0001-7654-9794, University of Warwick, autor correspondente)
Ano2019
Volume63
Fascículo4
Páginas840-858
Data de publicação2019-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12451
OpenAlexW2945849670
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas37
Referências citadas60

Research shows that peacekeepers reduce conflict intensity; however, effects of deployment on nonpolitical violence are unknown. This article focuses on criminal violence and proposes a twofold mechanism to explain why peacekeeping missions, even when effectively reducing conflict, can inadvertently increase criminal violence. First, less conflict opens up economic opportunities (so‐called peacekeeping economies) and provides operational security for organized crime, thus increasing violent competition among criminal groups. Second, demobilized combatants are vulnerable to turn to crime because of limited legal livelihood opportunities and their training in warfare. While UN troops may exacerbate these dynamics, UN police's peculiar role is likely to successfully contain criminal violence. Cross‐national and subnational empirical analyses show that large UN military deployments result in higher homicide rates, whereas UN police, overall, moderate this collateral effect

Collateral · Competition (biology · Criminology · Peacekeeping · Political science · Software deployment · Unintended consequences · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Engineering · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology