Going into Government
How Hiring from Special Interests Reduces Their Influence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230096 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ryan Hübert (0000-0003-1556-4127, University of California, Davis), Janna King Rezaee (Independent researcher), Jonathan Colner (0000-0001-8633-2839, University of California, Davis) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 485-498 |
| Publication date | 2023-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12701 |
| OpenAlex | W4211025427 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 32 |
Governments routinely decide to involve special interests in the development of public policy, a practice that can distort policy outcomes away from the public interest. Many are concerned that these policy distortions increase when special interest aligned individuals—such as lobbyists, activists or industry insiders—go into government. Using a formal model that centers the role of policymaking capacity in the development of policy, we demonstrate this is not always what happens. Our analysis provides two core insights. First, when an individual from a special interest group goes into government, this can paradoxically reduce the special interest's influence over public policy. Second, this individual has an endogenous incentive to enter government even though doing so weakens the special interest, whose preferences the individual shares. The model suggests that politicians' efforts to stop the practice of hiring individuals from special interest groups can counterintuitively increase special interest influence over politics
Business · Core (optical fiber · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Interest group · Law and economics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public interest · Public policy · Public relations · Special Interest Group · Auction Theory and Applications · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Learning While Governing
Revolving Door Lobbying
The value of connections in turbulent times
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court
Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation
Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision
Policy-Development Monopolies
Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policy Making
Lobbyists as Gatekeepers
Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections
In and Out of the Revolving Door
Spatial Models of Legislative Effectiveness
A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC
Dynamic Policymaking with Decay
Getting Their Way
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight
Signaling with Reform
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Exit Strategy
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |