Analyzing Committee Power
A Critique
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230927 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Wilkerson (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 613 |
| Publication date | 1991-08-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111557 |
| OpenAlex | W2331821801 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 2 |
In The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage, Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers (1988) offer a technique for assessing committee power empirically. My purpose in this paper is to critique their application of that technique to the minimum wage case. Any analysis based on roll call data is necessarily based on assumptions about behavior and agenda formation processes. This critique illustrates some considerations that efforts to apply the technique of Krehbiel and Rivers, or any effort to draw inferences about preferences from voting behavior, must take into account. Prima facie, alternative assumptions about senators' voting behavior and beliefs during the minimum wage debate seem equally plausible, but are shown to lead to different conclusions about committee power. Ultimately, however, I find the conclusions of Krehbiel and Rivers to be robust-my revised analysis also fails to support the committee power hypothesis
Economics · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Prima facie · Voting · Wage · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1991 - 2017 (27) |
| Highly cited | No |