Do Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments
The Evidence from an Expert Survey
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231013 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Warwick (0000-0001-7792-6475, Simon Fraser University, corresponding author), Paul V Warwick |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 373-387 |
| Publication date | 2005-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00129.x |
| OpenAlex | W1971320373 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 19 |
This article tests the hypothesis that parties in West European parliamentary systems operate under the constraint of “policy horizons,” that is, limits or bounds on the extent to which they can compromise on policy for the purpose of entering coalition governments. The test is based on a new expert survey covering thirteen West European parliamentary democracies in which respondents were asked not only to locate party positions on a number of policy dimensions, but also to estimate the parties' limits of acceptable compromise on each dimension. The survey data are first analyzed using a new computer program, Horizons 3D, to determine which parties have intersecting horizons in these systems—and hence the ability to form coalition governments under the hypothesis. These calculations are then employed to assess whether policy horizons structure the choice of governing coalition beyond any effect conveyed by the policy distances among parties. Although the potential for error in these data is considerable, the estimated horizons, with few exceptions, appear to play the role hypothesized for them
Compromise · Constraint (computer-aided design · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · New horizons · Political economy · Political science · Positive economics · Public economics · Statistics · Survey data collection · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Law · Mathematics · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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New Empirical Strategies for the Study of Parliamentary Government Formation
Empty Nets
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Portfolio Allocation or Policy Horizons? Determinants of Coalition Formation in Danish Local Government
Coalition-making under conditions of ideological mismatch
A Spatial Analysis of the Italian Second Republic
Can experts judge elections? Testing the validity of expert judgments for measuring election integrity
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The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems
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Ideology, Strategy and Party Change
Amelia II
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Parties and Democracy
Toward a Common Dimensionality in West European Policy Spaces
Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems
Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory
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Putting Parties in Their Place
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When Far Apart Becomes Too Far Apart
Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies
Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,29 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |