Oligarchy and Leadership Stability
The French Communist, Socialist, and Gaullist Parties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231121 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William R Schonfeld (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 215 |
| Publication date | 1981-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2110850 |
| OpenAlex | W2313533230 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 4 |
What is the relationship between the length of tenure in office of a political party's leaders and the way in which that party is governed? The oligarchy thesis presented by Roberto Michels and further developed by Maurice Duverger suggests that within democratic there is very great personnel stability. Data on the evolving composition of the French Communist, Socialist, and Gaullist parties do not support this argument. A more general theoretical statement is developed and then tested: leadership stability seems to vary between organizations having oligarchic as compared to monocratic forms of governance
Argument (complex analysis · Communism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Management · Oligarchy · Political economy · Political science · Political stability · Politics · Sociology · Law · Political Theory and Influence
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,19 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2024 (31) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |